







Nonlinear Effects of Inflation on Growth: Comment 
 
 
Richard C. K. Burdekin, Arthur T. Denzau, Manfred W. Keil, 
Thitithep Sitthiyot, and Thomas D. Willett 
 
















Key Words: Growth, Inflation, Nonlinearity. 






Contact: Thomas D. Willett, Horton Professor of Economics, Claremont Graduate 
University, 160 E. Tenth St., Claremont, CA 91711-6165. Phone: 909-621-8787; Fax: 
909-621-8460; E-Mail: thomas.willett@cgu.edu. 
       Claremont Colleges
               working papers in economics
Claremont Graduate University • Claremont Institute for Economic 
Policy Studies • Claremont McKenna College • Drucker  Graduate 
School of Management • Harvey Mudd College • Lowe Institute • 
Pitzer College • Pomona College • Scripps College   1 
Nonlinear Effects of Inflation on Growth: Comment 
 
One of the most important developments in macroeconomic policy-making over the last 
two decades has been the growing recognition that inflation is usually bad for economic 
growth. There is still substantial disagreement among researchers, however, about how 
quantitatively important are the growth depressing effects of inflation and at what levels 
of inflation these effects begin to appear. Some economists have been concerned by rates 
of inflation of three or four percent while others have been unconcerned by rates of 
twenty or thirty percent. 
  A recent paper by Sarel (1996) makes an important contribution to the research 
literature on the growth effects of inflation. Much of the literature has assumed that the 
effects of inflation on growth are linear. But threshold rates of inflation may have to be 
surpassed before the growth depressing effects of inflation become important. Sarel 
shows that failure to take such thresholds into account leads to a substantial downward 
bias in estimates of the growth costs of inflation. Most analysis of nonlinear or threshold 
effects (such as Fischer, 1993; Barro, 1996; and Sarel, 1996) groups together industrial 
and developing countries. Recent research has demonstrated that the size of the growth-
depressing effects of inflation differ substantially between the industrial and developing 
countries, however.
1 Thus it seems quite likely that the position of thresholds may differ 
as well. 
  Once the threshold has been passed, there is a second potentially important aspect 
of the nonlinear effects of inflation on growth not discussed by Sarel. The marginal 
growth costs may not be constant as the rate of inflation increases. While the total costs   2 
of inflation will undoubtedly continue to climb as the inflation rate increases, it seems 
quite plausible that at least after some point the marginal effects will begin to decline. 
Thus, for example, going from an inflation rate of 30 to 40 percent seems likely to 
generate more additional uncertainty than going from 130 to 140 percent. Indeed Fischer 
(1993), using break points of 15 and 40 percent, shows the coefficients on inflation rates 
above 40 to be substantially lower than for those between 15 and 40. Barro (1996), on the 
other hand, is not able to reject linearity for his sample. Using the same breakpoints as 
Fischer, Barro finds that the differences in coefficients are not significant. The pattern    
(-0.16, -0.37, and -0.23) is, however, suggestive of nonlinearity of the same type found 
by Fischer. While we believe Fischer’s results to be quite plausible, his thresholds were 
picked by judgment rather than statistical methods. Sarel makes an important innovation 
by following a search procedure for the initial threshold that he identifies as eight percent 
for his combined sample of industrial and developing countries. He does not discuss the 
issue of the behavior of the marginal costs of inflation once the threshold is passed, 
however. 
  We follow Sarel’s search procedure but consider separately the data for industrial 
and developing countries and find that they do indeed tell different stories.
2 As reported 
in Tables 1 and 2, we detect the threshold of nine percent for industrial countries and ten 
percent for developing countries. These thresholds differ little from Sarel’s eight percent 
threshold for his combined sample. For the industrial countries, the effects of rising rates 
of inflation below the threshold are negative, but statistically insignificant, just as Sarel 
found for his combined sample. However, for the developing countries, the effects below   3 
the threshold are positive and significant, albeit fairly small compared with the negative 
effects above the threshold. 
  Sarel enters inflation in log form. A log linear relationship of course implies a 
diminishing marginal cost of inflation. But when Sarel breaks his sample into sub groups, 
the coefficients on the log of inflation rise as inflation increases, making it difficult to 
infer anything about changes in marginal cost. We searched for multiple breaks but found 
only one when using the log of inflation. However, in a separate paper (Burdekin et al. 
2000) we analyze the levels rather than logs of inflation. This results in evidence for 
multiple breaks for the developing countries sample at around 50 and 100 percent, each 
break being associated with a substantial decline in marginal costs.
3 We also find that, 
while estimates of the effects of raising inflation from low initial rates remain positive, 
large, and significant, the threshold at which the marginal effects of higher inflation 
becomes negative falls from ten to three percent. 
  The substantial difference between Sarel and ourselves in our findings for 
developing countries may result not only from the choice of functional form but also the 
consideration of negative values of inflation. Since one cannot take the log of a negative 
number, Sarel replaced all of the negative inflation rates in his sample with 0.1, a 
procedure we also followed for the results in Tables 1 and 2. When we use the actual 
inflation rates, we can of course include the true negative values. To check whether the 
influence of levels versus logs of inflation was the primary cause of the difference in the 
estimated initial threshold level for the developing countries, we again deleted all 
negative inflation rates. This had virtually no effect on the threshold or coefficient values 
(the greatest difference being 0.001), except for the first threshold. When the negative   4 
rates of inflation are omitted, the first threshold drops to one percent while the coefficient 
on the zero to one range remains positive and significant but becomes implausibly large 
(rising from 0.36 to 6.2).  
We suspect that these results are telling us that negative rates of inflation are 
inimical to growth, and that the largest proportional gains from policy come from 
avoiding outright deflation. While the possibility of a narrow range of positive inflation 
rates helpful to growth cannot be ruled out, we believe that more research is called for 
before recommending even limited inflation as an actual policy goal, however.  As 
former Bundesbank President Otmar Emminger once put it: “In the long run, an economy 
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First difference of inflation 
 
0.13 
        (4.13) 
Log of previous period real GDP 
per capita 
-0.03 




        (4.28) 
Ratio of real government 
expenditure to real GDP 
-0.003 
        (4.01) 
Inflation: below 9% 
 
-0.02 
        (1.38) 
Inflation: above 9% 
 
-0.05 
        (8.17) 
 
Inflation: without structural 
breaks 
-0.008 
        (9.01) 
 












First difference of inflation 
 
-0.00006 
      (0.28) 
Log of previous period real GDP 
per capita 
0.018 




        (1.48) 
Ratio of real government 
expenditure to real GDP 
-0.0019 
       (3.99) 
Log (1 + black-market exchange 
rate premium 
-0.021 
        (2.73) 
Percentage change in terms of 
trade 
0.031 
       (3.78) 
Inflation: below 10% 
 
0.0040 
      (2.53) 
Inflation: above 10% 
 
-0.019 
        (8.23) 
 
Inflation: without structural 
breaks 
-0.0037 
       (2.89) 
 
Notes: R-squared = 0.32; number of observations = 1180. 
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1 See, for example, Burdekin et el. (1994, 1995) and Kim and Willett (2000). 
 
2 Sarel investigates 87 combined industrial and developing countries. Because of problems of data 
availability, our sample was a little smaller. We investigated 21 industrial and 51 developing countries 
separately. Sarel employes five year-average data from 1970-1990 while we use annual data from 1967-
1992. Sarel’s data sources are Penn World Tables (5.5) and World Tables (World Bank). In addition we use 
World Currency Year Books, and International Financial Statistics (CD-ROM). Most of our variables are 
similar to Sarel (first difference of inflation, initial income, population growth, and government expenditure 
for industrial countries) but we omit two control variables (black market exchange rate premium and the 
terms of trade) since they are not significant. For developing countries, the sets are the same. Sarel’s 
estimation method is OLS with country and period dummies. We use GLS with country dummies for 
industrial countries since we found no differences across periods for the industrial countries (1967-1972, 
1973-1982, and 1983-1992). For the developing countries, we use GLS with both period and country 
dummies. 
 
3 These results are reported in detail in Burdekin et al. (2000). 
 
4 Quoted in Schlesinger (1984, p. 98). 